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Manufacturing in the
National• Economy
ALTHOUGH we have progressed only a few steps. toward an
understanding of the developments in manufacturing em-
ployment and production during the twentieth century, we
have had to hack our way through a rather thick jungle of
facts and figures. At this final point we shall review our jour-
ney and conclude by noting how trends in the field of manu-
facturing are related to the general economic development of
the United States.
A SUMMARY OF CHANGES
IN AMERICAN FACTORIES
Manufacturing employees in 1937, the last peak year of busi-
ness preceding the present war, numbered ten million, as
compared with five million in 1899. Factory jobs therefore
doubled in the four decades between these two years.
The rise in number of factory workers after 1899, impres-
sive though it was, fell far short of the almost fourfold in-
crease in factory output during the same period. The number
of workers employed in factories to turn out a unit of manu-
factured product thus declined by 50 percent during the four
decades. And this cut probably understates the actual decline
in employment per -unit if only because of improvements in
the quality of manufactured products, for which no allowance
is made in our output index. Unit labor requirements fell
more sharply than even such a refined figure, if we had it,
would imply; for the decrease in employment of factory
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workers per unit of product was accompanied by a very con-
siderable drop in weekly hours of labor. A full-time week
shrank from an average of about 60 hours per person in
1899 to about 40 hours in 1937. Since the number of workers
needed per unit of product was cut in half, and hours were
reduced by a third, there was a drop of two thirds in aggre-
gate manhours per unit. In short, by 1937 only about one
third as many manhours of factory work went into the fabri-
cation of a given quantity of goods as 38 years earlier.
The factors making for reductions in labor per unit of
product have not had the same impact on all manufacturing
industries. For this reason the average for manufacturing in
the aggregate cOnceals wide differences among industries. In
some there were only minor decreases or even rises in the
labor-output ratio; in others the declines were precipitate.
In eight of the 51 industries for which our information
covers the period 1899—1937, employment, per unit of prod-
uct was cut by seven tenths or more. Heading the list is
automobile manufacture (with a decline of nine tenths), fol-
lowed by industries as diverse as beet sugar, silk and rayon
goods, industrial chemicals, and blast-furnace products. At
the bottom of the list are eight industries in which the
employment-output ratio rose: three in the field of transpor-
tation equipment (railroad cars, locomotives and ships), and
five others (turpentine and rosin, lumber-mill products, meat
packing, linen goods and wool-felt hats).
The indexes of manhours per unit, too, vary from industry
to industry with respect to rate of change, although they de-
clined in all except two of the industries covered by separate
indexes. The exceptions are locomotive manufacture and
shipbuilding. These are among the in which
employees per unit of output rose; the other six join the in-
dustries in which labor per unit of product was cut when
their labor input is measured in terms of manhours instead
of men.
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No doubt the exception2d position of the few industries
that did not succeed in reducing labor per unit of output
appreciably is to be attributed in some degree to our inability
to take statistical account of advances in the quality of their
products. Perhaps the more important consideration, how-
ever, is suggested by the interesting fact that those industries
which lagged in cutting down on the labor needed to turn
out a unit of product either failed to expand their output
between 1899 and 1937 or actually curtailed it. On the other
hand, the industries at the head of the list usually expanded
output faster than the average. Indeed, it was the industries
with particularly large increases in both employment and
output between 1899 and 1937 which tended to have excep-
tionally large declines in employment per unit, whereas those
with under-average increases in both tended, to reduce em-
ployment per unit less sharply than the average. Jobs per unit
of product fell most precipitately in the automobile industry,
in which we find the largest expansions both in total employ-
ment and in output. Again, in industrial chemicals employ-
ment increased eightfold and output multiplied twenty-five
times, with a consequent decline of almost three quarters in
labor per unit. In lumber mills, on the other hand, employ-
ment per unit went up by a fifth; at the same time the number
of workers decreased in the same proportion and .the volume
of product fell off by a third.
We may conclude, then, that when an. industry's output
has grown rapidly, even a substantial decrease in the number
of workers employed per unit has not usually meant fewer
jobs in that industry. If output has expanded only moder-
ately, however, a decline in the ratio of men employed to
units produced has commonly coincided with' rather slow
growth in the number of jobs, and sometimes has, actually re-
sulted in a reduced volume of employment. Yet an increase
in workers employed per unit has not necessarily been accom-
panied by increase in the labor force in the few industries156 MANUFACTURINGEMPLOYMENT
that ran counter to the general trend, for these were usually
the ones whose output shrank at the same time.
Exceptionally large declines in labor per unit have been
characteristic of rapidly growing industries. These industries
have other interesting features in common as well. They have
tended to effect particularly large reductions not only in
labor per unit but also in wage costs per unit of product, in
unit value added (that is, wage and overhead costs, including
profits), and in selling price. In automobile manufacturing
we find a striking combination of all these tendencies: here
output and manhours of employment were increased be-
tween 1909 and 1937 by percentages larger than those in any
other industry covered here (5,000 and 300, respectively);.
and in this same industry unit labor requirements, unit wage
costs, unit value added, and average selling price were cut by
the largest percentages (92,70,. 75 and 40, respectively).'
Petroleum refining, chemicals, beet sugar, and canned foods
also are to be singled out for these relationships. Conversely,
the, industries that fell behind in reducing unit labor re-
quirements and in expanding output and employment were
slow to cut unit costs and prices. Among the laggards we find
the industries manufacturing cotton goods, woolen and
worsted goods, carpets and rugs, lime, and lumber.
The invçrse relation we have noted between employment
and output on the one hand and th& employment-output
ratio on the other holds for changes over specific periods,
1899—1937 or 1909—1937. Obviously all industries were not
in the same phase of development during these years—some
were coming into being, some were reaching their prime,
some were already on the way out. The relationships for
1899—1937 or 1909—1937 therefore represent averages for in-
dustries at various stages of their careers. This observation
leads us to the question: HOw are employment, output, and
the labor-output ratio related during each of the successive
stages through which an industry passes?SUMMARY :57
The growth of an industry, in terms of. output, proceeds
at a rate that diminishes more or less steadily from decade
to decade, until, when peak output is attained, it becomes
zero, and finally negative. The course of retardation may be
illustrated by the cigar industry. Between 1869 and 1879 the
output of cigars rose by 7.5 percent per annum, and between
1879 and 1889., by 6.1 percent. During each of the next two
decades cigar manufacture increased annually by 3.3 percent,
but between 1909 and 1919 the rate was only 0.1 percent. In
the two following decades it fell: by 1.2 percent per year
between 1919 and 1929, and by 2.7 percent in 1929—37. In an
industry with an initial spurt as meteoric as that of automo-
bile production one discovers an extremely rapid rate of
retardation: the output of automobiles rose at an annual rate
of 43 percent during the first decade of the present century,
32 percent in the second decade, and 13 in the third; then a
decline set in, and production dropped at the rate of 1.3
percent per annum between 1929 and 1937.
Employment, too, grows at a decelerating rate. Just as out-
put in most industries has tended to expand less and less
rapidly with the passage of time, so the percentage increase
in employment has usually diminished. Reductions in hours
off labor have modified this pattern, but have not radically
altered. its general outline.
Retardation of growth in both output and the number
employed by an industry does not mean, of course, that the
movement of employment is exactly the same, at any one
time, as that of output. Because of widespread and more or
less persistent declines in employment per unit of product,
aggregate employment in any one period usually grows more
slowly than output; and maximum peaks in the former fre-
quently precede maximum peaks in the latter. Among 72
industries which reached peaks in both employment and out-
put prior to 1939, the high point in employment followed the
peak in output in only 11. In 23, mainly because of cyclical158 MANUFACTURINGEMPLOYMENT
and random fluctuations impressed on both series, the two
dates coincide. In the other 38 industries, over half of the
sample, employment reached a peak and began to recede
while output was still expanding; and in as many as 15 of
these, output reached its peak more than a decade later than
employment. There is evidence, moreover, that the highest
peak in manhours leads the highest peak in output in a pro-
portion of industries greater than 38 out of 72, and that the
average lead of the manhour peak over the output peak is
longer than the average lead of the employment peak over
the output peak.
If we may judge by the statistics analyzed in this report,
during the early stages of a manufacturing industry's career
employment goes upward with output while employment
per unit shrinks; during the middle stages the number of
workers employed also tends to drift downward, although
output is still advancing; and during the late stages all three
tend to drop. In young industries, whose output characteris-
tically shoots up quickly, the enormous gains in production
usually more than counterbalance the declining trend in the
labor-output ratio; as a consequence, employment too ex-
pands rather rapidly. During the mature phase of an indus-
try's development output expands slowly, if at all; now the
gain in volume of product is not great enough to offset the
declining trend in the labor-output ratio, and as a result jobs
decrease unless the working week is cut sufficiently to com-
pensate for the lessening need of labor per unit. In old and
waning industries, falling output offers no counterweight to
diminishing unit labor requirements, so that even substantial
cuts in the hours of work per week fail to halt reductions in
the number of workers employed.
When we look at manufacturing in the aggregate, we see
that change in total factory employment is the net result of
the shift of workers into new industries, the rapid multiplica-
tion of jobs in the young industries that survive in the initialSUMMARY 159
struggle for breathing space, the moderate growth (but from
a higher level) of industries close to maturity, the stagnation
in older industries, the decline in waning industries, and
finally the disappearance of employment in defunct indus-
tries. Technological changes contribute to all these develop-
ments, for they are basic not only to the ebb of employment
in mature and decadent industries but also to the emergence
and exploitation of new fields of employment. Technological,
evolution is thus a factor in the hiring of workers as well as
in their firing.
Capital investment, too, if it can be considered apart from
developments in technology, has played a dual role in the
opening up of employment opportunities and in their indus-
trial distribution. On the one hand, an industry's output (and
the employment it offers) has seldom expanded unless capital
has flowed into it; whereas industries with shrinking output
and employment have not commonly increased their aggre-
gate assets at the same time. There have been exceptions, of
course. Since an influx of capital is only one of the means by
which an industry's output is augmented, some industries
may have grown, during some periods, with little or no in-
crease, or even a decrease, in their capital assets; and it is
conceivable that capital assets, by displacing other factors of
production, have swelled even in a few declining industries.
Nevertheless, what we know of industrial history bears out
the broad observation made here. Between 1904 and 1937 the
largest increases in both jobs and output occurred in the
major groups of manufacturing industries whose fixed assets,
in terms of net book values,- grew most rapidly. Automobiles,
petroleum refining, electrical machinery, chemical and rub-
ber products stand out in this respect. And among the groups
with relatively slight increases in output and employment,
notably tobacco, textiles, leather, and forest products, are the
industries with less-than-average increments to capital assets.
It is equally true, however, that an inflow of capital hasi6o MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
usually been accompanied by sharp cuts in labor require-
ments per unit. Inevitably, then, when output fails to expand
sufficiently to balance the decline in unit labor, new capital
investment is associated with fewer jobs. Here also the change
in the employment offered by an industry is seen to cor-
respond in direction with change in capital investment at
certain stages of an industry's growth.. Though adequate sta-
tistical information is lacking, it seems likely that in the early
stages capital investment is accompanied by an increase in
jobs; that in the mature period it coincides with static or
declining employment, and that in the later stages disinvest-




The great reduction since 1899 in the factory labor utilized
per unit of output (one half in terms of workers, two, thirds in
terms of manhours), and the corresponding advance in out-
put per worker or per manhour, provide us with a rough
indication of the growth of manufacturing productivity.
These changes cannot, of course, be regarded as exact meas-
ures of the gain in the power and efficiency of manufacturing
industry, for shifts in the ratio between output and labor
input may have come about through the substitution of other
production factors for workers, or of one type of labor for
another. For example, if costs are incurred in the operation
and maintenance of the cigar machines which displaced cigar
makers, or in the purchase of the electric power which super-
seded the factory production of power, the measurable reduc-
tion in labor per unit must overstate the net gain in produc-
tivity. On the other hand, the substitution of unskilled for
skilled labor (say, cigar-machine operators for hand workers)
may signify an economy that is not reflected in the measuresSUMMARY i6i
of labor input available to us. (Of course, if the skill of the
displaced workers is thereby rendered obsolete, as it often is,
the gain is merely a gross gain, in the accounting sense, from
the viewpoint of society at large; for in casting up its ac-
counts the nation must give full consideration to the negative
consequences of any industrial development.)Similarly,
capital-saving innovations lead to advances that can hardly be
gauged by any productivity ratio we are able to compute.
Yet even liberal allowance for biases of this sort would not
invalidate the conclusion that productivity has soared up-
ward rather generally throughout manufacturing enterprise.
This enhancement of factory efficiency cannot be credited
entirely to our manufacturing industry. Nor, indeed, because
manufacturing constitutes merely one sector of our economy,
can its productivity be fully understood or explained when
viewed in isolation. The career of any single industry, great
or small, is a thread woven into a complex pattern, to. which
it contributes its share of color, texture, and design, and from
which it derives most of its meaning.
There is ample evidence that the labor-output ratio in
manufacturing is affected by the kind and quality of the
materials secured from nonmanufacturing industry. It is
widely known, for instance, that selection of seed and techno-
logical advances have raised the sugar content of beets, so
that there has been a gain in the sugar yield obtained by man-
ufacturers per ton of beets treated. And in another field, the
introduction of the flotation process, which led to the con-
centration of an increasing fraction of copper ores by the
mining industry, has lessened the effort expended in the fac-
tory to derive a given quantity of copper in the smelting
process. Similarly, such forms of nonmanufacturing endeavor
as engineering and independent research have made their
contributions to manufacturing. They have been the original
source of many ideas concerning materials, products, proc-
esses, as well as organization and management, and have162 MANUFACTURINGEMPLOYMENT
helped also to transmit ideas from one industry to another.
For all ideas do not originate in the industries utilizing them.
They spring up in different areas of the industrial cosmos
and merge in a common pooi drawn upon by all types of
enterprise.
Perhaps the stellar role in the contribution of nonmanu-
facturing industries to factory productivity has been played
by transportation, and in particular by the railroad system,
which has opened up many new sources of raw materials.
Thus lumber manufacturers have extended their operations
to virgin forests, thereby at least postponing increases in their
costs. Again, highly concentrated localization of factories,
with the fine division of labor and other advantages it im-
plies, depends upon cheap and efficient transportation not
only from sources of supply to factory but also among spe-
cialist plants. The immense expansion of the factory system
would have been inconceivable without the extension of the
railway system.
The growth of the economy at large has augmented the
scale of operations and raised the level of productivity in
manufacturing perhaps even more rapidly than in other
fields of industry, for fabricated goods have acquired a
favored place in consumers' budgets as incomes have risen. It
is true, of course, that in some instances an expansion of the
scale of operations may press upon limited natural resources,
thus causing the employment of more, rather than less, labor
per unit of product. Occasionally such a tendency is noted
in mining, and, if demand leads to the exploitation of mines
yielding low grades of ore, the result may even be an adverse
effect upon manufacturing productivity. But the evidence
gathered in this study indicates that growth of .factory output
has usually been associated with more, rather than less, out-
put per worker employed.
The relation of manufacturing to the entire economy has
always been a reciprocal one. Changes in one industry stimu-SUMMARY 163
latechanges in others, through imitation, competition and
cooperation. Many new devices and materials have resulted
from a collaboration between producing industries on the
one hand, and consuming industries on the other. Steel com-
panies have helped to develop new materials for many of
their smaller customers and for some of their large ones as
well—notably the railroads. Less direct, perhaps, but even
more obvious in its results is the sort of cooperation that
yields improvements both in engines and in types of fuel and
lubricants. Specifically, it is interesting to observe the high
degree of correlation between trends in octane numbers of
gasoline and in compression ratios of automobile engines.
And then, of course, there are the specialist "assistant indus-
tries' '—accountants,advertising agencies,engineers, com-
mercial laboratories, efficiency advisers, and so on—which not
only work out new techniques but 'also act as transmission
belts for those developed elsewhere.
Just as nonmanüfacturing industries have contributed to
the expansion of manufacturing, so the latter has served to
stimulate industry in other segments of the economy. Manu-
facturing has enhanced the productivity of nonmanufactur-
ing industry both by taking over some of the tasks formerly
done outside the factory and by supplying better and cheaper
tools and materials for nonmanufacturing use. The substi-
tution of the factory-made tractor for the farm-bred horse set
free the farm labor that formerly was devoted to rearing,
feeding, and caring for draught animals. And this is only one
of a multitude of examples to which the reader can easily add
from his own store of information and experience.
Growth in the efficiency of any single industry or group of
industries—manufacturing or nonmanufacturing—is thus in-
timately related to developments elsewhere in the economy.
Advance in manufacturing productivity is part of the evolu-
tion of the entire industrial system. For this reason we must
learn to look not only within but beyond factory walls for an164 MANUFACTURINGEMPLOYMENT
understanding of the rise of manufacturing industries, and
come to regard the increase in output per unit of labor in
manufacturing as merely one observation on the change in
the productivity of the entire economy.
FACTORY EMPLOYMENT AND OUTPUT
AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
Like the growth of factory productivity, the trends that have
characterized employment and output in manufacturing in-
dustry are aspects of the development of the economy at large.
Factory output itself rose more rapidly than the total national
product; the national income, adjusted for changes in prices,
went up about 130 percent from 1899 to 1937, while the out-
put of fabricated goods almost quadrupled. Factory output
thus advanced about 50 or 60 percent more than the total
product. But such a relative increase should not have been
unexpected during this stage of our development. The rise
in national income percapitabrought with it a greater de-
mand for processed commodities.It made possible the
transfer of domestic chores like baking, canning, cooking,
and sewing from the home to the factory, and it lessened the
burden of many other tasks which factory-made goods (wash-
ing machines, vacuum cleaners, and other devices) could now
accomplish more easily and efficiently. Aside from the rela-
tive increase in the volume of final consumer commodities
passing through factories,these enterprises undertook a
greater share of the production of other commodities. Such
processes as butter- and cheese-making and animal slaughter
were shifted from farm to factory, and the work of the farmer
was eased by the increased fabrication of fertilizers, agricul-
tural machinery, tractors and fuel. Factories turned to pro-
ducing more and more of the "horse" power consumed in
farm operations. A similar development characterized the
relations between factories and nonagricultural industries
such as mining, where mechanical excavators and loadersSUMMARY 165
tookover much of the labor formerly needed at the pit.
Factory output grew also because manufactured products
came to occupy a larger place among our exports.
Just as factory output rose with the national income, be-
tween 1899 and 1937, so factory employment increased with
the total number of jobs held by the gainfully occupied
population. Once again we find that the trends did not run
exactly parallel'. Factory employment rose more rapidly than
total employment and thus reflected a rise in the fraction of
our available human resources• devoted to manufacturing
operations. But the disparity between the two trends in em-
ployment was less marked over the entire period 1899—1937
than that between the two output trends during the same
period. The explanation is to be found in the more rapid
increase in output per worker in factories than in the economy
as a whole, a fact which was undoubtedly associated with the
more rapid rise in factory output than in the total national
product.
The changes in the relation between manufacturing and
the entire economy did not take place at a uniform rate dur-
ing the four decades beginning with 1899. Factory output
climbed rapidly throughout thefirst three decades, but
changed only fractionally between 1929 and 1937; and the
increase in factory output, relative to the national product,
came almost entirely during the first two decades. Factory
employment rose oniy during the first two decades, both
absolutely and in relation to total employment. During the
1920's and 1930's it remained unchanged, except for cyclical
fluctuations, and in relation to total employment it actually
declined during the 1920's.
During the 1920's, therefore, the gain in factory output
was accomplished entirely by an increase in output per fac-
tory worker. In this period the newcomers to our working
population apparently were not needed in manufacturing
and could be diverted to nonmanufacturing operations, espe-i66 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
cially trade and service. Even in these occupations, it is pos-
sible that they contributed in some part to the increase in
factory productivity and thus to the rise in factory output,
for, as we have seen, factory productivity reflects many more
changes than those occurring exclusively within factories.
Between 1929 and 1937, the maintenance of the level of
factory output was accomplished by an increase in output
per manhour, since the number of workers remained Sun-
changed as a result of the sharp cut in hours of labor. In this
period employment in nonmanufacturing industries also
failed to grow, so that the annual increase in the number
of our working population served merely to swell the ranks
of the unemployed.
When viewed against the background of retardation in the
growth of employment in individual manufacturing in-
dustries, the failure of total factory employment to rise
during the 1920's and the decline in manhours of employ-
ment during the 1930's seem to indicate that manufacturing
is approaching, or has already reached, maturity. There is
some evidence, indeed, that the ratio of factory personnel to
the total number of persons gainfully occupied has suffered
retardation in recent decades. But the evidence is not con-
clusive: the ratio rose 12 percent from 1870 to 1880; 6 percent
from 1880 to 1890; 8 percent from 1890 to 1900; 2 percent
from 1900 to 1910; and 19 percent from 191.0 to 1920; from
1920 to 1930 it fell 13 percent, but in 1930—37 it rose again,
though only by about 2 percent.' The figures reveal a tend-
ency to decline with the passage of time, but the variation
about the downward trend is rather considerable. For output,
adequate data are not available for the years prior to 1899.
While the information covering the last four decades is not
inconsistent with the presence of retardation in factory out-
1Thefigures for 1870—1930 are derived from Daniel Carson's analysis of the
Census of Occupations (Labor Supply and Employment, unpublished manu-
script of theNational Research Project); and those for 1930—37 from Depart-
ment of Commerce estimates.SUMMARY 167
put,it, too, can hardly be considered as proof of such a
tendency.
On the statistical side, therefore, one may well doubt
whether the growth of factory employment and output has
consistently decreased in speed in relation to the rate of de-
velopments in the remainder of the economy, and thus
whether the rates of change since 1919 and particularly from
1929 to 1937 are part of a clearly-defined trend. Yet even if
retardation were to be considered accurately descriptive of
the past relative growth of our factories, it is questionable
that it could be interpreted as a sign of the approaching ma-
turity of manufacturing. There is, of course, the complica-
tion raised by the present war, during which manufacturing
has already expanded enormously. But aside from this "devia-
tion," one is confronted by the inherent difficulty of charac-
terizing as mature any major divisiOn of an economy, especially
one as heterogeneous as manufacturing. Only a homogeneous
industry can be treated as a single entity, so that an inference
concerning its future may be hazarded from its past trend.
But factories produce commodities at various stages of com-
pletion (pig iron, steel sheets, machine tools, and automo-
biles); and articles satisfying diverse wants (foods, textiles,
construction materials, capital equipment, and durable con-
sumers' goods). It is true that the pace of the shift of pro-
duction from the household to the factory may slacken and
ultimately cease, ifit has not already done so; and full
mechanization of farm and mine may finally be accom-
plished. In that event these forces, which in the past have
stimulated rapid growth in our factories, may no longer
operate. Yet there also exist potential factors that may cause
manufacturing to grow. Among these are further develop-
ments of new processed materials, such as plastics; the shift of
work from the construction site to the factory if extensive
prefabrication of building materials becomes practicable; the
full-fledged mechanization of trade and the service industries;i68 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
and the development of various new consumer goods. These
possibilities, if realized, may cause a resurgence of manufac-
turing.
Qualifications concerning predictions as to the future of
factory output apply equally to forecasts of the trend in fac-
tory employment. Whether the failure of factory employment
to rise during the 1920's and 1930's portends a corresponding
horizontal trend (or even an actual recession) after the pres-
ent war boom has ended it is impossible to predict. There are
snares in simple reasoning. And as is true of factory output,
the future course of factory employment cannot be deter-
mined merely by a consideration of the variables related
directly to manufacturing.
Nor can the significance of past trends, in factory employ-
ment be appraised if attention is confined to factories alone.
Stable or declining numbers of factory workers are not of
themselves tragic omens. If employment in the rest of the
economy is rising, as it was up to 1929, declining factory em-
ployment may mean either a diversion of energy from one
type of production to another, or an advantageous reduction
in the amount of labor required to fabricate a given amount
of product. In that case, not only the growth but also the
stagnation of factory employment falls into perspective as an
aspect of our general economic advance. And if employment
in all types of industry fails to, rise, as during the 1930's, the
roots of the problem posed by a declining number of factory
workers reach far outside factory walls, and the solution of
that problem must be sought in study of an area broader than
manufacturing alone.